Trust problems hamper many social and economic exchanges. In such situations, there are often institutions that enable trustors to share information on the performance of trustees. While the benefits of such institutions have been researched extensively, little is known about their emergence. This article presents a game-theoretic model for the understanding of investments by trustees in establishing information sharing between trustors. The model allows for a simultaneous analysis of investments in and effects of institutions for information sharing. It captures two mechanisms by which a trustee’s investment can promote trust. First, a trustee’s investment in establishing information sharing can enable network effects that facilitate trust and trustworthiness. Second, it can promote trust by serving as a signal of intrinsic trustworthiness. The analysis of the model implies predictions for how characteristics of the interaction situation affect whether these mechanisms motivate a trustee to establish information sharing.

中文翻译：

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通过促进沟通促进信任：信息共享中的受托人投资模型

信任问题阻碍了许多社会和经济交流。在这种情况下，通常会有一些机构让委托人能够分享受托人表现的信息。虽然已经对此类机构的好处进行了广泛的研究，但对其出现的情况却知之甚少。本文提出了一个博弈论模型，用于理解受托人在建立信任人之间的信息共享方面的投资。该模型允许同时分析信息共享机构的投资和影响。它抓住了受托人的投资可以促进信任的两种机制。首先，受托人在建立信息共享方面的投资可以实现促进信任和可信度的网络效应。其次，它可以通过作为内在可信度的信号来促进信任。