How are rules enforced in the absence of an organization with coercive powers? I examine the role of informal institutions in supporting self-enforcement of rules through ethnographic research on a popular form of community-based gambling in the Philippines. In ending, a reputation-based mechanism shapes exchange relations between bettors and bet-takers, and among members of a local community. Social norms about sharing one’s winnings (balato) provide community members with an interest in the outcome of these exchange relations, thereby strengthening the ability of bettors to acquire information about the reputation of various bet-takers. In consequence, bet-takers exert efforts to safeguard their reputation, and comply with informal rules about the immediate and complete delivery of winnings. The findings suggest that when communities are small enough so that members are able to observe each other, but not too small so that no individual possesses all the relevant information, then social norms that generate effective transmission of reputational information provide sufficient institutional support for self-governance.

中文翻译：

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终结机构：自治系统中的规则执行

在没有具有强制力的组织的情况下，规则如何执行？我通过对菲律宾一种流行的社区赌博形式的人种学研究，研究了非正式机构在支持规则自我执行方面的作用。最后，基于声誉的机制塑造了投注者和投注者之间以及当地社区成员之间的交换关系。关于分享奖金的社会规范 (balato) 使社区成员对这些交换关系的结果感兴趣，从而增强了投注者获取有关各种投注者声誉的信息的能力。因此，投注者努力维护他们的声誉，并遵守有关立即和完整交付奖金的非正式规则。