From early in life, human infants appear capable of taking others' perspectives, and can do so even when the other's perspective conflicts with the infant's perspective. Infants' success in perspective-taking contexts implies that they are managing conflicting perspectives despite a wealth of data suggesting that doing so relies on sufficiently mature Executive Functions, and is a challenge even for adults. In a new theory, I propose that infants can take other's perspectives because they have an altercentric bias. This bias results from a combination of the value that human cognition places on others' attention, and an absence of a competing self-perspective, which would, in older children, create a conflict requiring resolution by Executive Functions. A self-perspective emerges with the development of cognitive self-awareness, sometime in the second year of life, at which point it leads to competition between perspectives. This theory provides a way of explaining infants' ability to take others' perspectives, but raises the possibility that they could do so without representing or understanding the implications of perspective for others' mental states. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

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婴儿是否偏心？对方与自我在早期的社会认知中。

从婴儿的早期开始，人类婴儿就似乎能够采取他人的观点，并且即使他人的观点与婴儿的观点发生冲突也可以这样做。婴儿在取景方面的成功意味着尽管有大量数据表明他们正在处理相互矛盾的观点，但事实表明这样做依赖于足够成熟的执行功能，即使对于成年人也是一个挑战。在新的理论中，我建议婴儿可以接受他人的观点，因为他们有一个偏心偏见。这种偏见是由于人类认知将注意力转移到其他人的注意力上，以及缺乏相互竞争的自我视角，这在年龄较大的儿童中会产生需要执行职能解决的冲突。自我认知随着认知自我意识的发展而出现，这是在生命的第二年的某个时候，这会导致观点之间的竞争。该理论提供了一种解释婴儿采取他人观点的能力的方式，但增加了他们可能在不代表或理解观点对他人心理状态的影响的情况下这样做的可能性。（PsycINFO数据库记录（c）2019 APA，保留所有权利）。