In ‘The politics of value in urban development: Valuing conflicts in agonistic pluralism’, McAuliffe and Rogers (2019) critically examine the ethical basis of Chantal Mouffe’s (1993, 2000, 2005, 2013) agonistic pluralism. According to them, this is because Mouffe makes a sharp distinction between subjective and ethical or moral values that are beyond reason and political/normative values that are more susceptible to rational debate (McAuliffe and Rogers, 2019: 6). Rather than accepting that ‘not all values are beyond reason’ (p. 11), they claim that a marked distinction Mouffe subsequently makes between these values prohibits her from analysing, e.g., why people persist in fighting for particular radically distinct values (e.g. truth, justice), empirical conditions that might facilitate what Mouffe calls the ‘democratic task’ of agonistic pluralism, or the transformation from more ethically driven antagonistic forms of politics towards more productive normative value-driven agonistic ones (McAuliffe and Rogers, 2019: 6). This short response wishes not to gainsay McAuliffe and Rogers’ (2019) enormously insightful perspective they call ‘radical ethical pluralism’ (p. 11) but to merely point out that they may have overexaggerated the sharpness of the distinction Mouffe draws between the ethical and the normative values and mischaracterised Mouffe’s democratic task as a result. This would be a shame, for McAuliffe and Rogers (2019: 1) entirely agree with Mouffe in considering this task necessary for constructing genuinely open, inclusive and democratic planning practice. Strictly speaking, then, the democratic task is in fact a possible way merely of carrying out politics. It involves differentiating and excluding ‘the enemy’ from ‘adversaries’, or friendly enemies, (Howarth, 2008: 178) and making contingent political decisions in the face of competing interpretations of the liberal democratic values or principles of

中文翻译：

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从价值到意义：探讨尚塔尔·穆菲（Chant Mouffe）激动性多元主义的伦理基础

McAuliffe和Rogers（2019）在``城市发展中的价值政治：重视冲突多元主义中的冲突''中，批判性地研究了Chantal Mouffe（1993，2000，2005，2013）冲突多元论的伦理基础。根据他们的说法，这是因为Mouffe在超出理性的主观和道德或道德价值观与更容易进行理性辩论的政治/规范价值观之间做出了鲜明的区分（McAuliffe and Rogers，2019：6）。他们声称，穆菲其后在这些价值观之间做出了明显区分，而不是接受“并非所有价值观都超出了理性”（第11页），这使她无法进行分析，例如，人们为何坚持为特定的，根本不同的价值观而奋斗（例如真理，正义），可能促进穆菲所说的激动性多元主义的``民主任务''的经验条件，或从更具道德驱动的对立政治形式向更具生产力的规范性价值驱动的激动形式转变的形式（McAuliffe and Rogers，2019：6）。这种简短的回应并不是要说McAuliffe和Rogers（2019）的观点极具洞察力，他们称之为``激进的伦理多元主义''（第11页），而只是指出他们可能过分夸大了Mouffe在伦理与道德之间的区分的鲜明性。因此，规范价值和误导了Mouffe的民主任务。对于McAuliffe和Rogers（2019：1）完全同意Mouffe认为构建真正开放，包容和民主的计划实践所必需的这项任务，这是完全可耻的。严格来说，那么，民主任务实际上仅仅是政治的一种可能方式。它涉及将“敌人”与“敌人”或友好敌人区分开来（Howarth，2008：178），并在对自由民主价值观或民主原则进行相互竞争的解释时做出或有的政治决定。