Abstract

Previous research suggests that client politics shape national migration laws in that they converge toward more liberal regulations. An examination of recently released cross-country data suggests, however, that there is little support for either convergence or generally more open policies. Trying to shed light on this empirical puzzle, I argue that democratic policymakers have incentives to listen to, and pursue policies that are favored by, the ‘unorganized’ electorate as well, since this maximizes their chances of staying in power. However, due to the influence of client interests that work against the public’s view on migration, a positive effect should only materialize under more salient circumstances, that is, when the inflow of foreign-born individuals is high. I analyze these expectations quantitatively using data that combine information on national migration policies with all European Social Survey rounds in 2002–2016. I find robust and significant support for public opinion influencing domestic immigration laws, but this effect only emerges with rather large migrant and refugee populations in the country.

中文翻译：

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舆论如何引导国家移民政策

摘要

先前的研究表明，客户政治塑造了国家移民法，因为它们趋向于更自由的法规。然而，对最近发布的跨国数据的研究表明，对于趋同或更开放的政策几乎没有支持。为了阐明这个经验性难题，我认为民主政策制定者也有动机去倾听并追求“无组织”选民所支持的政策，因为这可以最大限度地提高他们继续掌权的机会。然而，由于客户利益的影响不利于公众对移民的看法，只有在更突出的情况下，即外国出生的个人流入量很高时，才会产生积极的影响。我使用将国家移民政策信息与 2002-2016 年所有欧洲社会调查轮次相结合的数据，对这些预期进行定量分析。我发现对影响国内移民法的公众舆论有强大而重要的支持，但这种影响只有在该国相当多的移民和难民人口中才会出现。