This article interrogates the dissent by Justice Sonia Sotomayor in Utah v. Strieff, a Fourth Amendment case on lawful police searches, to track the political assumptions that undergird conceptions of the legal boundaries of police search and seizures. Specifically, the author examines how the vestiges of slavery structure both the constitutive elements of how bodily autonomy and freedom from physical invasion is understood under the law. Thus, by employing critical Black Studies in tension with affect theory, this article questions what limits are present in the law that reify, even or especially through dissent, the ontological arrangements of slavery and its afterlife.

中文翻译：

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论（存在）恐惧：犹他诉斯特里夫案和情感本体论

本文对 Sonia Sotomayor 法官在 Utah v. Strieff 案中的异议进行了审问，这是关于合法警察搜查的第四修正案案件，以追踪支持警察搜查和扣押法律边界概念的政治假设。具体而言，作者研究了奴隶制的遗迹如何在法律下理解身体自主和免受身体侵犯的构成要素。因此，通过在情感理论的紧张关系中运用批判性黑人研究，本文质疑法律中存在哪些限制，这些限制甚至或尤其是通过异议具体化了奴隶制及其来世的本体论安排。