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Dreaming, reflective consciousness, and feelings in the preschool child.
Dreaming ( IF 0.8 ) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 , DOI: 10.1037/drm0000040
David Foulkes

LeDoux (2015) discriminates creature consciousness, in which an organism is awake and alert, processing currently available stimuli, from mental-state consciousness, which is characterized by the possibility of reflection about current or past events and the ability to imagine new situations or scenarios. He establishes criteria for distinguishing the two, and finds no other animal that can experience conscious emotional feelings, nor more generally exhibit mental-state consciousness. A plausible extrapolation of his argument to humans suggests that they share this inability until about age 5. Tulving’s (2005) analysis of the development of episodic memory leads him to characterize the preschooler as anoetic, since the child is unable to encode conscious mental imagery capable of later recollection. Dreaming is another instance of mentalstate consciousness (Nir & Tononi, 2010), and the gold standard of research on dreaming is achieved in the modern sleep laboratory protocol. Longitudinal sleep laboratory studies have shown that dreaming is basically absent at ages 3 and 4, conforming to the general anoetic pattern of waking research on preschoolers, and confirming that dreaming also is a mental-state phenomenon. Resistance to accepting the sleep-laboratory data at face value seems to rest on an assumption that children must be inhibited by the laboratory setting, but this assumption already was refuted by direct home-lab comparisons in the same longitudinal project.

中文翻译:

学龄前儿童的做梦、反思意识和感受。

LeDoux (2015) 区分生物意识,其中生物体是清醒和警觉的,处理当前可用的刺激,与精神状态意识,其特征在于反思当前或过去事件的可能性以及想象新情况或场景的能力. 他建立了区分两者的标准,并没有发现其他动物可以体验有意识的情绪感受,也没有更普遍地表现出精神状态意识。他对人类的论证的合理推断表明,他们在大约 5 岁之前都有这种无能。 Tulving (2005) 对情景记忆发展的分析使他将学龄前儿童描述为厌食症,因为孩子无法编码有意识的心理意象后来的回忆。做梦是精神状态意识的另一个例子 (Nir & Tononi, 2010),现代睡眠实验室协议实现了做梦研究的黄金标准。纵向睡眠实验室研究表明,在 3 岁和 4 岁之间基本不做梦,符合对学龄前儿童清醒研究的一般性厌食模式,并证实做梦也是一种心理状态现象。拒绝接受表面上的睡眠实验室数据似乎基于这样一种假设,即儿童必须受到实验室环境的抑制,但这一假设已经被同一纵向项目中的直接家庭实验室比较所驳斥。纵向睡眠实验室研究表明,在 3 岁和 4 岁之间基本不做梦,符合对学龄前儿童清醒研究的一般性厌食模式,并证实做梦也是一种心理状态现象。拒绝接受表面上的睡眠实验室数据似乎基于这样一种假设,即儿童必须受到实验室环境的抑制,但这一假设已经被同一纵向项目中的直接家庭实验室比较所驳斥。纵向睡眠实验室研究表明,在 3 岁和 4 岁之间基本不做梦,符合对学龄前儿童清醒研究的一般性厌食模式,并证实做梦也是一种心理状态现象。拒绝接受表面上的睡眠实验室数据似乎基于这样一种假设,即儿童必须受到实验室环境的抑制,但这一假设已经被同一纵向项目中的直接家庭实验室比较所驳斥。
更新日期:2017-01-01
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