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Can stimulus-incorporation and emotion-assimilation theorists revive the continuity hypothesis they deprived of cognitive meaning? A reply to Jenkins.
Dreaming ( IF 0.8 ) Pub Date : 2018-12-01 , DOI: 10.1037/drm0000091
G. William Domhoff

Jenkins’ (2018) attempt to defend the theorists I snidely called concept snatchers (based on a 1978 movie on “The Invasion of the Body Snatchers”) is beside the point: They did not take or steal ideas. They presented their version of the continuity hypothesis “without any mention of the original meaning of the concept . . .” (Domhoff, 2017, p. 15). They buried the original ideas by ignoring them, which is what led to the critique, not simply their adoption of the term. By talking about the everyday usage of the term continuity, Jenkins (2018) exculpated these theorists from a deficiency in their scholarship: a failure to address the full scientific literature in their articles. Moreover, the word “continuity” was not used in the study of dreams (the relevant usage domain) in the 6 decades before Bell and Hall (1971) proposed it. A search of PsycINFO for both “continuity” and “dream” anywhere in any record between 1806 and 1970 found only four relevant records. All of them appeared 60 years or more before the concept of a continuity hypothesis was introduced, only one comes close to it in substance, and none had any later impact on the cognitively based continuity hypothesis. Nor were there any mentions of “continuity hypothesis” and “dream” before 1971. The continuity of personal concerns between waking thought and dreaming is now well-established (Domhoff, 2018, Chapters 3 and 4). Incorporation theorists and emotion-assimilation theorists can gladly use the phrase “continuity hypothesis” if they can replicate their questionable empirical claims, which is doubtful.

中文翻译:

刺激合并和情绪同化理论家能否恢复他们剥夺了认知意义的连续性假设?对詹金斯的回复。

詹金斯 (2018) 试图为我冷嘲热讽地称为概念掠夺者的理论家辩护(基于 1978 年关于“身体掠夺者的入侵”的电影)是离题的:他们没有接受或窃取想法。他们提出了他们的连续性假设版本,“没有提及该概念的原始含义。. 。” (多姆霍夫,2017 年,第 15 页)。他们通过忽略原始想法来掩埋它们,这就是导致批评的原因,而不仅仅是他们采用了这个术语。通过谈论“连续性”一词的日常用法,詹金斯 (Jenkins) (2018) 为这些理论家的学术缺陷开脱:未能在他们的文章中解决完整的科学文献。而且,在Bell 和Hall (1971) 提出之前的6 个十年里,“连续性”这个词并没有用于梦的研究(相关使用领域)。在 PsycINFO 中搜索 1806 年至 1970 年之间任何记录中的“连续性”和“梦想”,只找到了四个相关记录。所有这些都出现在连续性假设的概念被引入之前 60 年或更长时间,只有一个在本质上接近它,并且没有一个对基于认知的连续性假设产生任何影响。在 1971 年之前,也没有提到“连续性假设”和“梦”。 清醒时的想法和做梦之间的个人关注的连续性现在已经确立(Domhoff,2018 年,第 3 章和第 4 章)。合并理论家和情感同化理论家如果可以复制他们有问题的经验主张,他们可以很高兴地使用“连续性假设”这个词,这是值得怀疑的。
更新日期:2018-12-01
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