In this study, we examine the versioning strategy for two-sided dating platforms. We assume a monopoly dating platform facing two sides of users (male and female) with different levels of willingness to pay across and within the same side. The platform knows the user type distribution on each side but does not know the exact types of the individual users. The platform needs to decide whether or when to offer different versions of its services to the different types of users. The main findings are as follows: (1) the platform should always serve both types of users on each side; (2) the platform should choose to conduct versioning when the proportion of low-type users is small and/or their taste for quality is markedly different from that of high-type users, and choose not to do so otherwise; (3) when versioning is optimal, the platform should degrade the low-quality version as much as possible; and (4) versioning is never socially optimal. The necessary condition for versioning to improve social welfare is that high-type users benefit more from quality improvement than low-type users suffer from quality reduction.

在这项研究中，我们研究了双面约会平台的版本控制策略。我们假设一个垄断的约会平台面向用户（男性和女性）的两个方面，并在同一方面和同一方面进行不同程度的支付。该平台知道每一侧的用户类型分布，但不知道各个用户的确切类型。该平台需要决定是否或何时向不同类型的用户提供其服务的不同版本。主要发现如下：（1）该平台应始终为双方的两种类型的用户提供服务；（2）平台应在低类型用户比例较小和/或他们对质量的偏好明显不同于高类型用户的情况下进行版本控制，否则选择不进行版本控制；（3）当版本控制最佳时，平台应尽可能降低低质量版本的质量；（4）版本控制从来都不是社会最佳的。版本控制以改善社会福利的必要条件是，与低质量用户遭受质量降低相比，高质量用户从质量改进中受益更多。