In platform competition, users get on board because of network effects, and they shape a distinct platform service supply chain (PSSC) structure contingent upon the participation decision of both sides, which can be: both sides single-homing (SH–SH), buyers single-homing and sellers partially multi-homing (SH–MH), buyers partially multi-homing and sellers single-homing (MH–SH), and both sides partially multi-homing (MH–MH). One thing in common is that in either PSSC, there exist both same-side and cross-side network effects among users. Although platform competition in practice can be easily captured, the impact of network effects on platform's pricing decisions in different scenarios may vary. Based on a stylized Hotelling model, this paper incorporates buyers' same-side network effects and both buyers' and sellers' cross-side network effects while considering heterogeneous taste preferences of users on each side. We analyze the two-sided pricing, market share, and platform profit in equilibrium and conduct sensitivity analyses under each scenario supplemented by numerical verification. For each case, the findings are as follows. (1) SH–SH: the equilibrium market shares of both platforms are equal yet unaffected by two-sided pricing. (2) SH–MH: the stronger the sellers' taste preferences and the users' cross-side network effects, the more the sellers prefer single-homing. When sellers' cross-side network effects are stronger than that of buyers, the platform posts a charge to sellers; otherwise, it offers a subsidy. (3) MH–SH: the stronger the buyer's taste preferences and the total network effects, the more the buyers prefer single-homing. Moreover, the buyers' same-side network effects have a non-monotonic impact on their price and a monotonically decreasing impact on the sellers' price. (4) MH–MH: whether equilibrium solutions exist is ambiguous.

在平台竞争中，用户由于网络效应而参与进来​​，他们根据双方的参与决策形成了独特的平台服务供应链（PSSC）结构，可以是：双方单归属（SH-SH），买方为单人房，卖方为多人房（SH-MH），买方为多人房，卖方为单人房（MH-SH），双方均为多人房（MH-MH）。一个共同点是，在任一PSSC中，用户之间都存在同侧和跨侧网络效应。尽管在实践中可以轻松捕获平台竞争，但是在不同情况下网络效应对平台定价决策的影响可能有所不同。基于程式化的Hotelling模型，本文结合了买方的同侧网络效应以及买方和卖方的网络效应。跨网络影响，同时考虑到用户的异味偏好。我们在均衡的情况下分析双方的定价，市场份额和平台利润，并在每种情况下进行敏感性分析，并辅以数字验证。对于每种情况，发现如下。（1）SH-SH：两个平台的均衡市场份额相等，但不受双面定价的影响。（2）SH-MH：卖方的口味偏好和用户的跨网络效应越强，卖方越喜欢单归属。如果卖方的跨网络影响力强于买方，则平台会向卖方收取费用；否则，将提供补贴。（3）MH-SH：买方的口味偏好和整体网络效应越强，买方越喜欢单归属。此外，买方的同侧网络效应对其价格具有非单调的影响，而对卖方价格具有单调的降低的影响。（4）MH-MH：是否存在均衡解是模棱两可的。