Focusing on the selection of green and low carbon (GLC) innovation, this paper builds an evolutionary game between manufacturing enterprises, and another model between an enterprise and the government. Based on the models, the dynamic evolution of the selection process was analyzed in details. The results show that the game between manufacturing enterprises will eventually converge, due to the cost advantage of some enterprises in traditional innovation and the spillover effect of GLC innovation results. Some enterprise will choose GLC innovation, but some will adhere to traditional innovation, while sharing part of the revenue of GLC innovation of others. After government intervention, the innovation behaviors of manufacturing enterprises will be compensated for, rewarded, or penalized by means of transfer payment, tax credit, etc. As a result, all enterprises will eventually switch to GLC innovation.

着眼于绿色和低碳（GLC）创新的选择，本文建立了制造企业之间的演化博弈，以及企业和政府之间的另一种模式。基于这些模型，详细分析了选择过程的动态演变。结果表明，由于一些企业在传统创新中的成本优势以及GLC创新成果的溢出效应，制造企业之间的博弈最终将趋于融合。一些企业会选择GLC创新，但有些企业会坚持传统创新，同时分享其他企业的GLC创新收入。在政府干预之后，制造企业的创新行为将通过转移支付，税收抵免等方式得到补偿，奖励或惩罚。结果，