ABSTRACT

This study examines market reaction to CEO appointments at state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2015. We find evidence that the market reaction to CEO turnover at SOEs is nonmonotonic. A negative market reaction dominates in a short window, whereas a positive market response prevails in a long window. In addition, we observe a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between the level of state ownership and shareholder reaction. Shareholders prefer CEO replacements at SOEs whose financial results are poor. We report a negative impact on abnormal returns if the CEO is in the pre-transition generation.

摘要

本研究考察了2000年至2015年间在华沙证券交易所上市的国有企业（SOE）对CEO任命的市场反应。我们发现证据表明，市场对国有企业CEO流动的反应是非单调的。负面的市场反应在短期内占主导地位，而正面的市场反应在长期内占主导地位。此外，我们观察到国家所有权水平与股东反应之间存在显着的倒U型关系。股东更喜欢财务业绩不佳的国有企业的首席执行官接任。如果首席执行官在过渡前，我们将报告对异常收益的负面影响。