This paper develops a micro-founded global games model of debt crises. I use this model to study which policies can help to prevent expectations-driven crises and how the desirability of such policies depends on market participants' expectations and the presence of economic policy uncertainty. I show that endogenous expectations amplify the effects of government policies, so that even a small policy adjustment can have significant effects. I find that policy uncertainty may increase the range of situations in which government policies can help prevent a crisis but decrease their overall impact. Finally, I apply these insights to study two policies that are often at the center of political discussions: austerity (an increase in taxes) and government stimulus. I show that under plausible conditions an increase in taxes is preferable to a government stimulus, and that policy uncertainty further increases the relative attractiveness of austerity.

本文开发了一种基于微观的债务危机全球博弈模型。我使用这个模型来研究哪些政策可以帮助防止预期驱动的危机，以及这些政策的可取性如何取决于市场参与者的预期和经济政策不确定性的存在。我表明内生预期会放大政府政策的影响，因此即使是很小的政策调整也会产生显着影响。我发现政策的不确定性可能会增加政府政策有助于预防危机但降低其整体影响的情况的范围。最后，我将这些见解用于研究经常处于政治讨论中心的两项政策：紧缩政策（增加税收）和政府刺激政策。