We replicate two treatments of an experimental theory test (Fehr et al., 2011) studying Hart and Moore (2008)’s idea that contracts serve as reference points in trading relationships. In contrast to rigid contracts, flexible contract terms may be perceived in a self-serving manner and, therefore, the contract parties might form subjective entitlements. This reference-dependent perception of flexible contract terms leads to a trade-off of the contractual form. While flexible contracts are, in theory, deemed preferable to rigid contracts, frustrated subjective entitlements may lead to perfunctory performance and shading behavior that is absent in rigid contracts. The results of our replication are mixed. Our findings imply further support for Hart and Moore (2008)’s contracts as reference point hypothesis. However, our replication does not provide reliable evidence for the idea that competition creates objectivity and enhances perceived fairness of the contract terms.

我们复制了两种研究理论测试（Fehr等人，2011）的方法，研究了Hart和Moore（2008）的观点，即合约可以作为交易关系的参考点。与刚性合同相反，可以以自私的方式来理解灵活的合同条款，因此，合同各方可以形成主观权利。灵活的合同条款的这种依赖于引用的理解导致了合同形式的折衷。虽然从理论上讲，柔性合同比刚性合同更可取，但受挫的主观权利可能会导致刚性合同中所缺乏的敷衍表现和阴影行为。复制的结果好坏参半。我们的发现暗示，将进一步支持Hart和Moore（2008）的合同作为参考点假设。然而，