A 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision encouraged district courts to rely more on license fees and less on injunctions as a remedy for patent infringement. This paper provides a simple model in which a patent-owning "patent assertion entity" (PAE) and an infringing firm engage in Nash bargaining over a possible license fee after the PAE initiates an infringement lawsuit. We compare a fee-based regime in which the court imposes a "fair value" license fee if there is no settlement with a regime in which failure to reach a settlement leads to an injunction that disrupts production. The injunctive regime always involves a settlement but, in a fee-based regime, settlements occur only for patents on drastic innovations (as defined by Arrow, 1962). For small incremental innovations, PAEs prefer the injunctive regime because negotiated license fees are higher. For higher value innovations, license fees are lower in the injunctive regime and PAEs would prefer the fee-based regime, contrary to the presumption that injunctive regimes necessarily favor PAEs.

2006年美国最高法院的一项决定鼓励地方法院更多地依赖许可费，而较少依赖禁令来作为专利侵权的补救措施。本文提供了一个简单的模型，在该模型中，拥有专利的“专利声明实体”（PAE）和侵权公司在NAE提起侵权诉讼后就可能的许可费进行纳什讨价还价。我们比较了基于费用的制度，在该制度中，如果没有解决方案，则法院将收取“公允价值”许可费；如果没有达成和解，则会导致制止生产的禁令。禁令制度总是涉及和解，但在收费制度中，和解仅针对具有重大创新的专利才发生（如Arrow，1962年所定义）。对于小型渐进式创新，PAE倾向于禁令制，因为协商的许可费较高。对于更高价值的创新，禁令制度中的许可费较低，PAE倾向于基于收费的制度，这与禁令制度必然偏爱PAE的假设相反。