ABSTRACT

This study analyses the role of trade credit insurance and the insuring strategy of the retailer and the manufacturer in a capital-constrained supply chain with one retailer, one manufacturer, and one insurer. We model the interaction among these three participants as a two-level Stackelberg game and explore their operational and financial decisions. We find that trade credit insurance is adopted when the manufacturer's loss aversion is high or the retailer's initial capital is low. The adoption of trade credit insurance improves the order quantity of the retailer, the performance of each supply chain participant, and supply chain efficiency. However, it also increases the bankruptcy risk of the retailer and the instability of the entire supply chain. In addition, the application of trade credit insurance by the manufacturer alone is more beneficial to the manufacturer, insurer, and entire supply chain as it creates better performance for them. Conversely, the purchase of trade credit insurance by the retailer is more desirable to the retailer as it yields not only a higher profit but also a lower bankruptcy risk.

摘要

本研究分析了贸易信用保险的作用以及零售商和制造商在一个零售商、一个制造商和一个保险公司的资本受限供应链中的保险策略。我们将这三个参与者之间的交互建模为两级 Stackelberg 博弈，并探索他们的运营和财务决策。我们发现，当制造商的损失厌恶程度高或零售商的初始资本低时，就会采用贸易信用保险。贸易信用保险的采用提高了零售商的订单数量，提高了每个供应链参与者的绩效，提高了供应链效率。但是，这也增加了零售商的破产风险和整个供应链的不稳定性。此外，制造商单独应用贸易信用保险对制造商、保险公司和整个供应链更有利，因为它为他们创造了更好的绩效。相反，零售商购买贸易信用保险对零售商来说更可取，因为它不仅会产生更高的利润，而且会降低破产风险。