Abstract:On its tenth anniversary, a great deal can be said about the decision in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick and the way that it and its progeny have impacted how courts approach judicial review in Canada. The grounds upon which decisions may be quashed have expanded, and reviewing courts now must consider the facts and circumstances underlying a decision under review as well as their impact on the Charter interests of a party challenging a decision. Nevertheless, the rules governing evidence admissible on judicial review have not been changed in any meaningful way since the nineteenth century. Those rules, generally speaking, still limit the admissibility of so-called ‘extrinsic’ evidence to situations involving alleged ‘jurisdictional errors’ or a breach of the duty of fairness. While perhaps not as exciting as other current issues in administrative law, it is one of tremendous practical significance to parties seeking to challenge the decisions of public authorities. The rigid evidentiary rules can mean that parties are not practically able to make the arguments that they would otherwise be entitled to make on review, and the task of the reviewing court can be frustrated. Operating from the thesis that the rules of evidence on judicial review should move in tandem with changes to the substantive law of judicial review, the authors propose a general rule permitting parties to adduce evidence necessary to the arguments they are permitted to make, subject to the courts’ discretion to exclude such evidence where there is a meaningful opportunity or expectation that the evidence be put before the decision maker at first instance. The issue of ‘what is the record’ is increasingly a live one on judicial review, particularly when non-adjudicative or policy decisions are under review. This is unlikely to change when the Supreme Court of Canada revisits Dunsmuir, unless the rules of evidence are modified in tandem.

中文翻译：

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邓斯缪尔和司法审查中可接受证据的范围：原则性限制还是路径依赖？

摘要：在其十周年之际，关于 Dunsmuir 诉新不伦瑞克案的判决以及它及其后代对加拿大法院如何处理司法审查的方式有很多说法。决定可能被撤销的理由已经扩大，复审法院现在必须考虑被复审决定所依据的事实和情况，以及它们对质疑决定的一方的宪章利益的影响。尽管如此，自 19 世纪以来，关于司法审查中可采信证据的规则并没有以任何有意义的方式改变。一般来说，这些规则仍然将所谓的“外在”证据的可采性限制在涉及所谓的“司法错误”或违反公平义务的情况下。虽然可能不像行政法中的其他当前问题那么令人兴奋，但对于寻求挑战公共当局决定的当事人来说，它具有巨大的实际意义。僵化的证据规则可能意味着当事人实际上无法提出他们本来有权在复审时提出的论点，复审法院的任务可能会受挫。从关于司法审查的证据规则应该随着司法审查实体法的变化而变化的论点出发，作者提出了一条一般规则，允许当事人对他们被允许提出的论点提出必要的证据，法院可酌情决定排除此类证据，前提是有有意义的机会或期望将证据提交初审决策者。“记录是什么”的问题越来越成为司法审查中的一个问题，尤其是在审查非裁决性或政策性决定时。当加拿大最高法院重新审理 Dunsmuir 案时，这种情况不太可能改变，除非证据规则也随之修改。