How language and thought interact is a hot topic of debate, and one that is refreshingly revisited by Hinzen in his paper entitled ‘Reference across pathologies: A new linguistic lens on disorders of thought’. The work is situated within the ‘un-Cartesian’ linguistics research program, which seeks to illustrate that the organizational principles of grammar directly configure human-specific thought (Hinzen 2007; Hinzen 2012; 2013; a.o.). The un-Cartesian program may at first glance seem reminiscent of other approaches arguing for an influence of language on thought, however it differs from them in important ways. In contrast to linguistic determinism, for instance, it posits “(n)o unidirectional causal arrow lead(ing) from language to thought” (Section 2.1). In contrast to NeoWhorfianism, un-Cartesian linguistics is concerned with the underlying grammatical principles common to all languages, thus cross-linguistic variations are not expected to give rise to cognitive variations. To sum up, for Hinzen, thinking is ‘languaging’ (Section 2.1) and any human language should arise together with human concepts, such as reference and propositional meaning. In light of this, Hinzen predicts both interand intra-species variations: These concepts should be absent from non-linguistic primates and, crucially, also be affected in instances of grammatical impairments within humans. Grammar, under this un-Cartesian lens, now becomes clinically relevant for cognitive disorders. In this contribution, I will focus on a particular aspect of cognition and its relation to language, namely the ability to think about the thoughts of others, also known as theory of mind (ToM). ToM has been centre-stage of much psycholinguistic research trying to shed light on the role of language in conceptual reasoning (de Villiers and de Villiers 2000; Carruthers 2002). Hinzen remarks: “As a psychological construct, ToM remains described by its broad

中文翻译：

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语法表型和认知表型是否相互照亮？对非笛卡尔语言学和Language-ToM接口的思考

语言和思想如何相互作用是辩论的热门话题，欣岑在题为“病理学的参考：思想障碍的新语言学视角”的论文中重新审视了这一话题。这项工作位于“非笛卡尔”语言学研究计划之内，该计划旨在说明语法的组织原理直接构成了特定于人类的思想（Hinzen 2007； Hinzen 2012； 2013； ao）。乍看之下，非笛卡尔程序似乎使人联想到其他方法，这些方法主张语言对思想的影响，但是它在重要方面与它们有所不同。例如，与语言决定论相反，它提出“从语言到思想的单向因果箭头导引”（第2.1节）。与新园艺主义相比，非笛卡尔语言学关注所有语言共有的基本语法原理，因此跨语言的变化不会引起认知的变化。综上所述，对于Hinzen而言，思维是“语言”（第2.1节），任何人类语言都应与人类概念（例如指称和命题含义）一起出现。鉴于此，Hinzen预测了物种间和物种内的差异：非语言灵长类动物应该没有这些概念，并且至关重要的是，在人类内部语法受损的情况下，这些概念也会受到影响。在这种非笛卡尔的视角下，语法现在在临床上与认知障碍有关。在这一贡献中，我将重点介绍认知的特定方面及其与语言的关系，即思考他人思想的能力，也称为心理理论（ToM）。ToM一直是许多语言学研究的中心阶段，试图阐明语言在概念推理中的作用（de Villiers和de Villiers 2000； Carruthers 2002）。Hinzen表示：“作为一种心理构造，ToM仍然以其广泛的形式来描述。