Hinzen presents a rich and potentially far-reaching account of the constitutive role of grammar in the formation of distinctively human thought, and further ventures a connection between grammar and various pathologies of thought: if thought (in the appropriate sense) just is linguistic structure, then a pathology of the former should be a pathology of the latter. My concern will be for the theoretical moves Hinzen makes in Section 2 of the paper by way of the articulation and defence of what he calls the un-Cartesian conception of the relation between language and thought. My principal interest will be to raise some conceptual and empirical doubts about the very idea of the un-Cartesian conception. Let a Cartesian conception of language-thought be one that identifies two distinct domains, with language serving to express or otherwise interface with an independent system of thought. Such a conception is most cleanly exhibited by the idea of a language of thought (LoT), which encodes propositional content as expressible in natural language, but which is supposed to be constituted independently of natural language, i.e., LoT has its own grammar and semantics (locus classicus, Fodor 1975). Hinzen, however, appears to intend the Cartesian conception to cover any position that distinguishes between thought and language, for the un-Cartesian conception is just one that renders humanly distinctive propositional thought as being essentially organised in terms of grammatical combinatorics defined over lexicalised concepts, i.e., ones specified via grammatical categories (noun, verb, etc.). My first concern is that such a demarcation of the Cartesian position is somewhat too blunt, lumping together otherwise significantly distinct positions. Imagine a position – the standard position of generative linguistics, no less – that sanctions a language-thought divide or interface, but still recognises that propositional thought is largely structured by linguistic combinatory technology. That is to say that the thought side, as it were, does not constitute a generative system of independently determinate thoughts, but rather extra-linguistic principles and procedures that serve as essential factors in the determination of full propositional

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语言笛卡尔的生成概念吗？

Hinzen提出了语法在人类独特思想形成中的构成作用的丰富且可能影响深远的说明，并且进一步探讨了语法与各种思想病理之间的联系：如果思想（在适当的意义上）只是语言结构，那么前者的病理应该是后者的病理。我关注的是Hinzen在本文第2节中通过表达和辩护他所谓的语言与思想之间关系的非笛卡尔概念而做出的理论动作。我的主要兴趣是对非笛卡尔概念的概念提出一些概念和经验上的疑问。让笛卡尔式的语言思想概念可以识别两个不同的领域，用来表达或与独立思想体系互动的语言。思想语言（LoT）的概念最清楚地展示了这种概念，该思想将命题内容编码为可以在自然语言中表达的内容，但应该独立于自然语言来构成，即LoT具有自己的语法和语义（Locus classicus，Fodor 1975）。但是Hinzen似乎打算让笛卡尔式的概念涵盖任何区分思想和语言的立场，因为非笛卡尔式的概念只是使人类独特的命题思想实质上是根据对词汇化概念定义的语法组合学来组织的，即，通过语法类别（名词，动词等）指定的词语。我首先要担心的是，这样对笛卡尔位置的划分太过钝了，将否则明显不同的位置集合在一起。想象一下一个位置，即生成语言学的标准位置，同样，该位置认可一种语言思想上的鸿沟或接口，但是仍然认识到命题思想很大程度上是由语言组合技术构成的。就是说，思想方面并没有构成独立确定思想的生成系统，而是构成了确定全面命题必不可少的因素的语言外原理和程序。同样，它认可了一种语言思维上的鸿沟或接口，但仍然认识到命题思想很大程度上是由语言组合技术构成的。就是说，思想方面并没有构成独立确定思想的生成系统，而是构成了确定全面命题必不可少的因素的语言外原理和程序。同样，它认可了一种语言思维上的鸿沟或接口，但仍然认识到命题思想很大程度上是由语言组合技术构成的。就是说，思想方面并没有构成独立确定思想的生成系统，而是构成了确定全面命题必不可少的因素的语言外原理和程序。