What is a speech act, and what makes it count as one kind of speech act rather than another? In the target article, Geurts considers two ways of answering these questions.1 His opponent is intentionalism—the view that performing a speech act is a matter of acting with a communicative intention, and that speech acts of different kinds involve intentions to affect hearers in different ways. Geurts offers several objections to intentionalism. Instead, he articulates and defends an admirably clear and resolute version of the view that performing a speech act is a matter of undertaking a social commitment. Different kinds of speech acts, on his view, involve social commitments of different kinds. My aim is to respond to Geurts on behalf of intentionalism. I’ll argue that his objections aren’t all that worrying (Section 3), that Geurts’ view suffers from some quite serious problems that intentionalists don’t face (Section 4), and that intentionalists can give a principled account of the ways that speech acts give rise to commitments (Section 5). First I will spell out the two opposing views (Sections 1–2).

中文翻译：

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言语行为的意图和承诺

什么是言语行为，是什么使它算作一种言语行为而不是另一种？在目标文章中，Geurts考虑了回答这些问题的两种方法。1他的对手是故意主义的观点，即演说行为是一种具有交际意图的行为，而不同类型的演说行为涉及影响听众的意图的观点。不同的方式。Geurts对意图主义提出了一些反对意见。取而代之的是，他表达并捍卫了一种令人钦佩的，清晰而坚决的观点，即演说行为是承担社会责任的观点。在他看来，不同种类的言语行为涉及不同种类的社会承诺。我的目的是代表故意主义对Geurts做出回应。我会争辩说，他的反对并不那么令人担忧（第3节），Geurts的观点遭受了故意主义者不会面对的一些非常严重的问题（第4节），并且故意主义者可以对言语行为产生承诺的方式进行原则性解释（第5节）。首先，我将阐明两个相反的观点（第1-2节）。