Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra(2015), have typically been based on the von NeumannMorgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional 'moves' in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra(2016) point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these solution concepts can yield unreasonable predictions. Dutta and Vohra (2016) restricted coalitions to hold common, history independent expectations that incorporate optimality regarding the continuation path. This paper extends the Dutta-Vohra analysis by allowing for history dependent expectations. The paper provides characterization results for two solution concepts corresponding to two versions of optimality. It demonstrates the power of history dependence by establishing nonemptyness results for all i¬ nite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The paper also provides partial comparisons of the solution concepts to other solutions.

中文翻译：

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联盟形成和历史依赖

例如 Harsanyi (1974) 和 Ray and Vohra (2015) 的联盟形成的远见公式通常基于 von NeumannMorgenstern (1944) 稳定集。这些有远见的稳定集合使用间接支配的概念，在这种概念中，结果可以由一系列联合“行动”控制，其中每个参与序列的联合最终都会受益。Dutta 和 Vohra（2016）指出，这些解决方案概念不需要联盟来做出最佳行动。因此，这些解决方案概念可能会产生不合理的预测。Dutta 和 Vohra（2016 年）限制联盟持有共同的、独立于历史的期望，这些期望包含关于延续路径的最优性。本文通过允许历史相关预期来扩展 Dutta-Vohra 分析。该论文提供了对应于最优性的两个版本的两个解决方案概念的表征结果。它通过为所有无限博弈以及可转移效用分配函数博弈建立非空性结果来展示历史依赖的力量。本文还提供了解决方案概念与其他解决方案的部分比较。