This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by partitions over possible worker type profiles. With this firm-specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures the idea that the absence of rematching conveys no further information. When an allocation is not stable under the status quo information structure, a new pair of an allocation and an information structure will be derived. We show that starting from an arbitrary allocation and an arbitrary information structure, the process of allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to rematch, accompanied by information updating, will converge with probability one to an allocation that is stable under the updated information structure. Our results are robust with respect to various alternative learning patterns.

中文翻译：

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匹配学习

本文研究了劳动力市场的稳定性概念和匹配过程，而工人方面的信息不完全。每个工人都与一个类型相关联，每个公司都关心匹配下她的员工的类型。此外，公司的信息结构是通过对可能的工人类型配置文件的划分来描述的。有了这个特定于公司的信息，我们提出了一个稳定性概念，除了要求个体理性和没有阻塞对之外，还捕捉到了没有重新匹配不会传达更多信息的想法。当分配在现状信息结构下不稳定时，将派生出一对新的分配和信息结构。我们表明，从任意分配和任意信息结构开始，允许随机选择的阻塞对重新匹配的过程，伴随着信息更新，将以概率 1 收敛到在更新的信息结构下稳定的分配。我们的结果对于各种替代学习模式是稳健的。