This paper provides a general analysis of comparative statics results in global games. I show that the effect of a change in any parameter of the global game model can be decomposed into the direct effect, which captures the effect of a change in parameters when agents' beliefs are held constant, and the multiplier effect, which captures the role of adjustments in agents' beliefs. I characterize conditions under which the multiplier effect is strong and relate it to the strength of strategic complementarities and the publicity multiplier emphasized in earlier work. Finally, I use the above insights to identify when comparative statics can be deduced from the model's primitives, when they do not depend on the information structure, and when they coincide with predictions of the complete information model.

中文翻译：

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全球政权更迭博弈中的乘数效应和比较静力学

本文提供了对全球博弈中比较静态结果的一般分析。我表明，全局博弈模型的任何参数变化的影响都可以分解为直接效应，它捕获了当代理的信念保持不变时参数变化的影响，以及乘数效应，它捕获了角色代理人信念的调整。我描述了乘数效应很强的条件，并将其与战略互补性的强度和早期工作中强调的宣传乘数联系起来。最后，我使用上述见解来确定何时可以从模型的原语中推导出比较静态，何时它们不依赖于信息结构，以及何时它们与完整信息模型的预测一致。