We characterize optimal contracts in a dynamic principal–agent model of joint production in which project opportunities are heterogenous, utility from these projects is nontransferable, and the agent has the option to quit the relationship at any time. To demand the production of projects that benefit her but not the agent, the principal must commit to produce projects that benefit the agent in the future. Production at all stages of the relationship is ordered by projects’ cost-effectiveness, which is their efficiency in transferring utility between the principal and the agent: cost-effective demands impose relatively low costs on the agent and cost-effective compensation imposes relatively low costs on the principal. Over time, optimal contracts become more generous toward the agent by adding commitments to less cost-effective compensation. In turn, because this new compensation cannot be profitably exchanged against less cost-effective demands, the principal narrows the scope of her demands.

中文翻译：

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动态关系中的生产优先级

我们在联合生产的动态委托代理模型中描述了最优合同，其中项目机会是异质的，这些项目的效用是不可转让的，并且代理人可以随时选择退出关系。为了要求生产有利于她而不是代理人的项目，委托人必须承诺在未来生产有利于代理人的项目。关系的所有阶段的生产都按照项目的成本效益进行排序，成本效益是他们在委托人和代理人之间转移效用的效率：成本效益要求对代理人施加相对较低的成本，成本效益补偿施加相对较低的成本在校长身上。随着时间的推移，通过增加对成本效益较低的补偿的承诺，最优合同对代理人变得更加慷慨。