We present a model of a discriminatory price auction in which a large bidder competes against many small bidders, followed by a post-auction resale stage in which the large bidder is endogenously determined to be a buyer or a seller. We extend results on first-price auctions with resale to this setting and use these results to give a tractable characterization of equilibrium behavior. We use this characterization to study the policy of capping the amount that may be won by large bidders in the auction, a policy that has received little attention in the auction literature. Our analysis shows that the trade-offs involved when adjusting these quantity caps can be understood in terms familiar to students of asymmetric first-price single-unit auctions. Furthermore, whether one seeks to maximize welfare or revenue can have contradictory implications for the choice of cap.

中文翻译：

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带有转售和最佳数量上限的歧视性价格拍卖

我们提出了一个歧视性价格拍卖的模型，其中大投标人与许多小投标人竞争，然后是拍卖后转售阶段，其中大投标人被内在地确定为买方或卖方。我们将带有转售的第一价格拍卖的结果扩展到这种设置，并使用这些结果来给出均衡行为的易处理特征。我们使用这个特征来研究对拍卖中大投标人可能赢得的金额设置上限的政策，这一政策在拍卖文献中很少受到关注。我们的分析表明，调整这些数量上限时所涉及的权衡可以理解为不对称首价单件拍卖的学生所熟悉的术语。此外，