This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general dynamic games with almost perfect information, and (2) the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in perfect-information dynamic games with uncertainty. Our results go beyond previous works on continuous dynamic games in the sense that public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. As an illustrative application, a dynamic stochastic oligopoly market with intertemporally dependent payoffs is considered.

中文翻译：

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具有（几乎）完美信息的动态博弈

本文旨在解决具有完美或近乎完美信息的有限或无限视界动态博弈的两个基本问题。在一些温和的条件下，我们证明了（1）在几乎完全信息的一般动态博弈中子博弈完美均衡的存在，以及（2）在具有不确定性的完美信息动态博弈中纯策略子博弈完美均衡的存在。我们的结果超越了之前关于连续动态博弈的工作，因为不需要公共随机化和状态变量的连续性要求。作为说明性应用，考虑了具有跨期相关收益的动态随机寡头市场。