The Supreme Court during the Chief Justiceship of John Marshall is associated with endorsement of broad regulatory powers in Congress and broad federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts under Article III. By contrast, the successor Court under Chief Justice Roger Taney remains tied to its determination in Dred Scott that Congress lacked powers to enact the Missouri Compromise prohibiting slavery in certain of the territories, and to Taney’s opinion that descendants of African slaves could never be citizens who could invoke the federal courts’ diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. This article addresses the ways in which the Taney Court nevertheless outdid the Marshall Court in terms of a nationalist approach to judicial federalism. The Marshall Court faced a political environment hostile to the Federalist-dominated federal courts, and in reaction repeatedly expressed respect for congressional power over its jurisdiction, and tied its expansions of federal judicial power closely to expansive views of congressional power. The Taney Court, by contrast, did not face similar political-branch threats. Its jurisdictional opinions were less deferential to Congress than Marshall Court opinions. And while the Marshall Court tied its expansions of judicial power to broad views of congressional power, the Taney Court’s expansions of judicial power operated to limit any concomitant expansion of congressional power. The Taney Court accomplished this by expanding diversity of citizenship jurisdiction beyond what the Marshall Court had done and by explicitly adopting the use of a uniform judge-made general common law in diversity cases. It also expanded admiralty jurisdiction by an interpretation of Article III’s admiralty provision that was contrary to Marshall Court precedent, and rejected a proffered Commerce Clause justification that would have entailed broader congressional powers. And when it channeled certain matters away from the state courts to the federal courts based on exclusive federal powers, the Taney Court relied on implied federal powers whose enforcement could be limited by notions of necessity, as distinguished from the Marshall Court’s looser version of “necessary and proper.”

中文翻译：

---

马歇尔和坦尼治下的司法联邦制

在约翰·马歇尔 (John Marshall) 担任首席大法官期间，最高法院与国会对广泛监管权力的认可以及联邦法院根据第三条规定的广泛联邦问题管辖权有关。相比之下，首席大法官罗杰·坦尼 (Roger Taney) 领导的继任法院仍然坚持其在德雷德·斯科特案中的决定，即国会无权颁布禁止在某些领土上实行奴隶制的密苏里妥协案，以及坦尼的意见，即非洲奴隶的后代永远不能成为公民可以援引联邦法院的公民管辖权的多样性。本文讨论了坦尼法院在司法联邦主义的民族主义方法方面仍然优于马歇尔法院的方式。马歇尔法院面临着敌视联邦主义者主导的联邦法院的政治环境，作为回应，一再表示尊重国会对其管辖权的权力，并将其对联邦司法权力的扩展与对国会权力的广泛看法紧密联系在一起。相比之下，坦尼法院没有面临类似的政治分支威胁。与马歇尔法院的意见相比，其管辖权意见对国会的尊重程度较低。虽然马歇尔法院将其司法权的扩张与国会权力的广泛观点联系在一起，但坦尼法院对司法权的扩张限制了国会权力的任何伴随扩张。坦尼法院通过将公民管辖权的多样性扩展到马歇尔法院所做的之外，并通过在多样性案件中明确采用统一的法官制定的一般普通法来实现这一目标。它还通过对违反马歇尔法院判例的第三条海事条款的解释扩大了海事管辖权，并拒绝了提出的商业条款理由，该理由将需要更广泛的国会权力。当它根据排他性的联邦权力将某些事务从州法院转移到联邦法院时，坦尼法院依赖于隐含的联邦权力，其执行可能受到必要性概念的限制，这与马歇尔法院较宽松的“必要性”版本不同。和适当的。”