In this article, I argue that in the seemingly straightforward ruling in Iancu v Brunetti, striking down a provision of the law governing trademarks, the Court revealed a significant clarification of the limits of the doctrine of viewpoint discrimination. In free speech doctrine, the Court is unanimous in condemning viewpoint discrimination, but its contours remain “slippery” because viewpoint bias is rarely a game changer in a given case. One enduring puzzle is whether a limit on the mode or manner of communication – a ban on racial epithets, for example – embodies viewpoint discrimination. This question has been unresolved for almost thirty years, ever since the Court’s murky opinion in R.A.V. v St. Paul struck down, as viewpoint based, an ordinance aimed at fighting words that “arouse[d] anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.” The Court was not clear whether the ordinance was viewpoint biased because it regulated one side of a public debate or limited a mode or manner of debate for both sides. The difference between these two possible readings matters: if limits on modes or manners of speech are deemed to be viewpoint discrimination, then it may be virtually impossible to enact, for example, bans on racial epithets at a public university. But Brunetti clarified matters considerably. The Court struck down the provisions of the Lanham Act prohibiting the registration of “immoral” and “scandalous” marks as viewpoint biased. The conflict between Justice Elena Kagan’s opinion for the Court and the lead opposition opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor illuminated an important area of agreement that appears to control a majority of the Court. That agreement is this: that worries about viewpoint bias do not ordinary come into play when the government regulates the mode and manner of communication as opposed to the ideas conveyed. Such a principle has a number of implications. Perhaps the most important is that R.A.V. is less significant in First Amendment doctrine than it has seemed for thirty years. Also, some kinds of speech codes could survive First Amendment challenge, as long as they apply in certain fora and are aimed at the mode and manner of communication rather than the ideas expressed. Another implication would be that it would be possible for Congress to rewrite the now-defunct provisions of the Lanham Act to survive First Amendment challenge and also satisfy much of Congress’s original goals.

中文翻译：

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商标、仇恨言论和解决观点偏见之谜

在本文中，我认为，在 Iancu v Brunetti 一案看似简单的裁决中，法院驳回了管辖商标的法律条款，显着澄清了观点歧视原则的局限性。在言论自由原则中，法院一致谴责观点歧视，但其轮廓仍然“滑溜溜”，因为观点偏见在特定案件中很少能改变游戏规则。一个持久的谜题是，对交流方式或方式的限制——例如禁止种族绰号——是否体现了观点歧视。自从法院在 RAV v St. Paul 案中模糊的意见推翻了一项法令，该法令旨在打击“引起[d] 愤怒、恐慌、或基于种族、肤色、信仰、宗教或性别对他人的不满。” 法院不清楚该条例是否存在观点偏见，因为它规范了公开辩论的一方或限制了双方的辩论模式或方式。这两种可能的解读之间的区别很重要：如果对言论模式或方式的限制被视为观点歧视，那么实际上可能不可能颁布，例如，在公立大学禁止种族称谓。但布鲁内蒂相当清楚地澄清了问题。法院驳回了《兰哈姆法案》中禁止将“不道德”和“丑闻”商标注册为观点偏见的规定。埃琳娜·卡根大法官对法院的意见与索尼娅·索托马约尔大法官撰写的主要反对意见之间的冲突说明了似乎控制着法院大多数人的重要共识领域。该协议是这样的：当政府规范沟通的方式和方式而不是传达的想法时，对观点偏见的担忧通常不会发挥作用。这样的原则有很多含义。也许最重要的是，RAV 在第一修正案学说中的重要性不如 30 年来看起来那么重要。此外，某些类型的语音代码可以在第一修正案的挑战中幸存下来，只要它们适用于某些论坛并且针对交流的模式和方式而不是表达的想法。