Once upon a time, Carolene Products provided an inspiring charter for the exercise of the power of judicial review. Intervene to correct flaws in the political process, Carolene instructed courts, but otherwise allow American democracy to operate unimpeded. In this Article, I use the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rucho v Common Cause to argue that the current Court flips Carolene on its head. It both fails to act when the political process is malfunctioning and intercedes to block other actors from ameliorating American democracy. Rucho is the quintessential example of judicial apathy when, under Carolene, judicial engagement was sorely needed. The Court acknowledged that partisan gerrymandering offends democratic values like majoritarianism, responsiveness, and participation. But the Court didn’t take the obvious next step under Carolene and hold that extreme gerrymanders are unlawful. Instead it went in exactly the opposite direction, announcing that partisan gerrymandering claims are categorically nonjusticiable. Rucho, however, is only the tip of the current Court’s anti-Carolene spear. Past cases have compounded (and future cases will likely exacerbate) the democratic damage by preventing non-judicial institutions from addressing defects in the political process. Looking back, the Court’s campaign finance decisions have struck down regulation after regulation aimed at curbing the harms of money in politics. Looking forward, the Court may well nullify the main non-judicial response to gerrymandering: independent redistricting commissions adopted through voter initiatives. What can possibly explain this doctrinal pattern? Conventional modes of analysis — originalism, judicial restraint, respect for precedent, and so on — all fail as justifications. They’re riddled by too many exceptions to be persuasive. What does seem to run like a red thread through the current Court’s rulings, though, is partisanship. The anti-Carolene Court may spurn pro-democratic judicial review in part because, at this historical juncture, it often happens to be pro-Democratic.

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反卡罗琳法庭

曾几何时，Carolene Products 为行使司法审查权提供了一个鼓舞人心的章程。卡罗琳通过干预纠正政治过程中的缺陷，指示法院，但除此之外，还允许美国民主不受阻碍地运作。在本文中，我使用最高法院最近在 Rucho v Common Cause 案中的裁决来论证当前法院推翻了 Carolene。当政治进程出现故障时，它既未能采取行动，又会出面阻止其他行为者改善美国民主。Rucho 是司法冷漠的典型例子，在 Carolene 的领导下，迫切需要司法参与。法院承认，党派选区侵犯了民主价值观，如多数主义、回应性和参与性。但在卡罗琳的领导下，法院并没有采取明显的下一步措施，并认为极端的格里曼德是非法的。相反，它朝着完全相反的方向发展，宣布党派分裂的主张绝对是不可审理的。然而，Rucho 只是当前法院反卡罗琳矛的尖端。过去的案例通过阻止非司法机构解决政治进程中的缺陷，加剧了（未来的案例可能会加剧）民主损害。回想起来，在旨在遏制金钱在政治中的危害的监管之后，法院的竞选财务决定已经取消了监管。展望未来，法院很可能会取消对选区划分的主要非司法回应：通过选民倡议采用的独立重新划分委员会。什么可以解释这种教义模式？传统的分析模式——原创主义、司法克制、尊重先例等等——都无法作为正当理由。他们被太多的例外所困扰，无法有说服力。然而，目前法院的裁决似乎像一条红线，是党派偏见。反卡罗琳法院可能会拒绝亲民主的司法审查，部分原因是，在这个历史关头，它往往是亲民主的。