We study how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through self-selection and incentive effect channels using a two-stage field experiment in Malawi. First, recent secondary school graduates were hired with either career or wage incentives. After employment, half of the workers with career incentives randomly received wage incentives, and half of the workers with wage incentives randomly received career incentives. Career incentives attract higher-performing workers than wage incentives do, but they do not increase productivity conditional on selection. Wage incentives increase productivity for those recruited through career incentives. Observable characteristics are limited in explaining selection effects of entry-level workers.

中文翻译：

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职业和工资激励在劳动生产率中的作用：来自马拉维两阶段实地试验的证据

我们使用马拉维的两阶段实地试验研究职业和工资激励如何通过自我选择和激励效应渠道影响劳动生产率。首先，最近的中学毕业生被聘用有职业或工资激励措施。就业后，有一半的职业激励工人随机获得工资激励，一半的工资激励工人随机获得职业激励。与工资激励相比，职业激励吸引了更高绩效的工人，但它们不会以选择为条件提高生产力。工资激励提高了通过职业激励招聘的人员的生产力。可观察的特征在解释入门级工人的选择效应方面是有限的。