We document measurable, lasting gains in student achievement caused by a change in teachers' evaluation incentives. A short-lived rule created a discontinuity in teachers' incentives when allocating effort across their assigned students: students who failed an initial end-of-year test were retested a few weeks later, and then only the higher of the two scores was used when calculating the teacher's evaluation score. One year later, long after the discontinuity in incentives had ended, retested students scored 0.03σ higher than non-retested students. Otherwise identical students were treated differently by teachers because of evaluation incentives, despite arguably equal returns to teacher effort.

中文翻译：

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评估会改变教师的努力和表现吗？学生复试政策的准实验证据

我们记录了由于教师评估激励的变化而导致的学生成绩的可衡量的、持久的收益。一个短暂的规则在分配给分配给他们的学生时造成了教师激励的不连续性：最初的年终测试失败的学生在几周后重新测试，然后只使用两个分数中较高的一个计算教师的评价分数。一年后，在奖励中断结束很久之后，重新测试的学生比未重新测试的学生得分高 0.03σ。否则，尽管教师努力的回报可以说是平等的，但由于评估激励，教师会以不同的方式对待同一学生。