Recent scholarship argues that Nevada’s lax corporate law, which exempts managers from fiduciary duties and discourages takeovers, may harm shareholders’ wealth. I present evidence that Nevada corporate law does not harm shareholder value for firms that self-select into Nevada, particularly small firms with low levels of institutional shareholding and high levels of insider ownership, and it may in fact enhance the value of these firms. A possible explanation is that Nevada’s promanagerial laws reduce the likelihood of takeovers and litigation, thereby benefiting a segment of small firms for which the costs of corporate governance may outweigh the benefits.

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松懈的公司法能否增加股东价值？内华达州的证据

最近的一项学术研究认为，内华达州松懈的公司法可以免除经理人的信托义务，并阻止收购行为，可能会损害股东的财富。我提供的证据表明，内华达州公司法不会损害自我选择在内华达州的公司的股东价值，特别是机构持股水平较低且内部人所有权较高的小型公司，实际上可能会提高这些公司的价值。可能的解释是，内华达州的所有权法减少了收购和诉讼的可能性，从而使一部分小型公司受益，而公司治理的成本可能超过这些收益。