A vertical most-favored-nation (vMFN) restraint prohibits a retailer from charging more for one supplier’s product than for rivals’ products. For credit card services, this restraint takes the form of a no-surcharge rule: the credit card company prohibits the retailer from surcharging transactions using the company’s card. This article develops a theory of vMFN restraints and applies it to credit cards. The vMFN clause harms competition among upstream suppliers, which raises price to a level even greater than the monopoly price. The vMFN clause can also be used to extract surplus from customers of products supplied competitively. Applying the theory to credit card antitrust cases, we find that the two-sided nature of the market does not mandate a new set of competition policy principles, contrary to the decision in Ohio v. American Express. Indeed, the economic literature on credit card networks as two-sided platforms rediscovers established principles of price theory.

中文翻译：

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纵向最惠国待遇和信用卡无附加费规定

垂直最惠国待遇（vMFN）限制禁止零售商向一个供应商的产品收取比竞争对手的产品更高的费用。对于信用卡服务，此限制采取无附加费用规则的形式：信用卡公司禁止零售商使用公司的卡收取交易附加费。本文提出了vMFN约束的理论并将其应用于信用卡。vMFN条款损害了上游供应商之间的竞争，从而将价格提高到甚至高于垄断价格的水平。vMFN子句还可用于从竞争性供应产品的客户中提取剩余。将这一理论应用于信用卡反托拉斯案件，我们发现市场的两面性并没有强制要求一套新的竞争政策原则，这与俄亥俄诉美国运通案的判决相反。确实，