We study the effects of above-cost exclusionary pricing and the efficacy of three policy responses by running experiments involving a monopoly incumbent and a potential entrant. Our experiments show that under a laissez-faire regime, the threat of postentry price cuts discourages entry and allows incumbents to charge monopoly prices. Current US policy does not help because it only bans below-cost pricing. In contrast, we find that a ban on postexit price hikes encourages entry; a ban on deep price cuts reduces preentry prices and encourages entry. While both these alternatives have less competitive outcomes after entry than laissez-faire does, they nevertheless both increase consumer welfare. For the latter proposal, this consumer gain is at the cost of lower overall welfare from attracting inefficient entrants, while for the former, overall welfare is comparable to current US policy.

中文翻译：

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狩猎独角兽？排他性定价政策的实验证据

我们通过进行涉及垄断在位者和潜在进入者的实验，研究了高于成本的排他性定价的影响以及三种政策对策的有效性。我们的实验表明，在自由放任制度下，进入后降价的威胁会阻止进入，并允许在位者收取垄断价格。当前的美国政策无济于事，因为它只禁止低于成本的定价。相反，我们发现禁止出口后价格上涨会鼓励入境。禁止大幅降价会降低进入前的价格并鼓励进入。尽管这两种选择都比自由放任后进入市场的竞争结果要少，但是它们都增加了消费者的福利。对于后一种建议，这种吸引消费者的利益是以吸引低效进入者为代价的总体福利的降低，而对于前者，