The recent surge in appraisal litigation has sparked debate over the desirability of appraisal and how this remedy should be structured. Much of this debate is based on untested assertions about appraisal’s ex ante effect on the structure and pricing of takeovers. Systematically investigating this effect, we find evidence that target shareholders receive higher abnormal returns as the strength of the appraisal remedy increases. We find no evidence that bidders offer a lower up-front price as a means to pay off dissenting shareholders after a sale. Furthermore, threat of appraisal does not appear to limit takeover activity or impact the method of payment. Overall, our results suggest that appraisal provides an important ex ante protection for target-firm shareholders.

中文翻译：

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司法鉴定阴影下的合并谈判

最近评估诉讼的激增引发了人们对评估的可取性以及该补偿应如何构成的争论。这场争论的大部分是基于未经评估的评估对收购结构和定价的事前影响。通过系统地调查这种影响，我们发现有证据表明，随着评估补救措施的力度增强，目标股东将获得更高的异常收益。我们没有证据显示出价者提供较低的前期价格作为在出售后还清持不同意见的股东的一种手段。此外，评估威胁似乎并未限制接管活动或影响付款方式。总体而言，我们的结果表明，评估为目标公司股东提供了重要的事前保护。