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The Distribution of Surplus in the US Pharmaceutical Industry: Evidence from Paragraph iv Patent-Litigation Decisions
The Journal of Law and Economics ( IF 2.2 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 , DOI: 10.1086/707407
Ruben Jacobo-Rubio , John L. Turner , Jonathan W. Williams

In paragraph iv pharmaceutical cases, a patent-litigation decision often determines whether a brand-firm monopoly continues or generic entry occurs. Using unique patent-litigation data and an event-study approach that accounts for probabilistic district court decisions and an appellate process, we estimate that brand-firm stakes in such cases average $4.3 billion while generic-firm stakes average $204.3 million. After the Schering-Plough v. FTC decision in 2002 that upheld a settlement in which the brand firm paid the generic firm in return for delayed entry, we find that settlement is more likely and stakes are significantly lower, despite greater average brand sales for the drugs in the cases. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that pay-for-delay settlements led to less within-market competition after 2002.

中文翻译:

美国制药业的盈余分配:来自第四节专利诉讼决定的证据

在第iv款药品案件中,专利诉讼决定通常确定品牌企业垄断是否继续或仿制药进入市场。通过使用独特的专利诉讼数据和采用事件研究方法来解释概率性地区法院的裁决和上诉程序,我们估计在这种情况下,品牌公司的股权平均为43亿美元,而非专利公司的股权平均为2.043亿美元。自2002年Schering-Plough诉FTC案判决维持了品牌公司向通用公司付款以换取延期进入的回报后,我们发现,尽管案件中的毒品。根据这些证据,我们得出结论,按延迟付款结算导致2002年以后市场内部竞争的减少。
更新日期:2020-05-01
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