We examine the impact of corporate governance laws on the private benefits of control, using the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a natural quasi experiment. We find a large decline in the average voting premium of US dual-class firms targeted by major SOX provisions that enhance boards’ independence, improve internal controls, and increase litigation risks. The targeted firms also improve the efficiency of investment, cash management, and chief executive officers’ compensation relative to firms not targeted by SOX. Overall, the evidence suggests that SOX is effective in curbing the private benefits of control.

中文翻译：

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《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》对双重投票制溢价的影响

我们使用2002年《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》（SOX）的颁布作为自然的准实验来检验公司治理法律对控制权私人利益的影响。我们发现，主要SOX条款将美国两类公司的平均投票溢价大幅下降，从而提高了董事会的独立性，改善了内部控制并增加了诉讼风险。相对于非SOX目标公司，目标公司还提高了投资，现金管理和首席执行官薪酬的效率。总体而言，有证据表明SOX可以有效抑制控制权的私人利益。