We explore enforcement spillovers, in which sanctions at one entity influence behavior at other entities. We model spillovers arising from a regulatory channel and from a channel not previously emphasized: product market interactions. Our model motivates empirical hypotheses, which we test using data from manufacturers subject to the Clean Water Act. We find that penalties create positive spillovers for other facilities facing the same regulatory authority, such that enforcement actions reduce pollution at facilities in the same regulatory jurisdiction. However, penalties generate negative spillovers for facilities in the same industry facing a different authority, such that enforcement actions increase pollution at facilities in the same industry but facing a different regulator. Reductions in pollution in a state issuing a fine are about 50 percent offset by increases in pollution in nearby states. Negative spillovers to entities outside of the jurisdiction can be thought of as enforcement leakage.

中文翻译：

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执法溢出：监管和产品市场中战略互动的经验教训

我们探讨了执法溢出效应，其中对一个实体的制裁会影响其他实体的行为。我们对源自监管渠道和先前未强调的渠道（产品市场互动）的溢出进行建模。我们的模型激发了经验假设，我们使用了受《清洁水法》约束的制造商的数据进行检验。我们发现，处罚会给面临相同监管机构的其他设施带来积极的溢出效应，从而执法行动可减少同一监管辖区中设施的污染。但是，罚款会对同一行业中面临不同权限的设施产生负面溢出效应，因此，执法行动会增加同一行业中面临不同监管机构的设施的污染。一个州的罚款减少量被附近州的污染增加量抵消了约50％。负向管辖区以外实体的溢出可能被视为执法泄漏。