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Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures
The Journal of Law and Economics ( IF 1.840 ) Pub Date : 2018-11-01 , DOI: 10.1086/700198
Martin Van der Linden

A peremptory-challenge procedure allows the parties to a jury trial to dismiss some prospective jurors without justification. Complex challenge procedures offer an unfair advantage to parties who are better able to strategize. I introduce a new measure of strategic complexity based on level-k thinking and use this measure to compare challenge procedures often used in practice. In applying this measure, I overturn some commonly held beliefs about which jury selection procedures are strategically simple.

中文翻译:

有限理性与陪审团选择程序的选择

强制性质疑程序允许陪审团审判的当事方在无正当理由的情况下解雇一些准陪审员。复杂的质询程序为更善于制定策略的各方提供了不公平的优势。我介绍了一种基于k级思维的战略复杂性的新度量,并使用该度量来比较实践中经常使用的挑战程序。在运用这项措施时,我推翻了一些普遍认为的关于哪些陪审团选择程序在战略上很简单的信念。
更新日期:2018-11-01
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