Abstract This paper studies the equilibria of contribution games with commitment and with cheap talk under incomplete information. When agents contribute to a club good, we find that with commitment, high types contribute early to induce low types to contribute in later rounds. With cheap talk, low types signal to contribute early but may drop out later if they find the total contributions are low. When there are sufficiently many rounds, we construct a cheap talk equilibrium that implements the ex-post efficient and ex-post individually rational allocation. In contrast, every equilibrium of the commitment game is inefficient. When the good is a public good, the cheap-talk game admits no informative equilibria. In this case, the equilibria of the commitment game may be more efficient.

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在贡献游戏中谈话应该便宜吗？

摘要本文研究了在信息不完全的情况下具有承诺和闲聊的贡献博弈的均衡。当代理商为俱乐部商品做出贡献时，我们发现，有决心的人会尽早做出贡献，而引起低矮的人会在随后的回合中做出贡献。便宜的谈话，低类型的人表示会提早做出贡献，但是如果他们发现总的贡献很低，则可能会稍后退出。当有足够多的回合时，我们构建一个便宜的话语均衡，实现事后效率和事后个人合理分配。相反，承诺博弈的每个平衡都是无效的。当商品是公共物品时，廉价谈话游戏不承认任何信息均衡。在这种情况下，承诺博弈的均衡可能更有效。