Abstract This paper analyses two properties of the core in a two-period exchange economy under uncertainty: the veto power of arbitrary sized coalitions; and coalitional fairness of core allocations. We study these properties in relation to classical (static) and sequential (dynamic) core notions and apply our results to asset markets and asymmetric information models. We develop a formal setting where consumption sets have no lower bound and impose a series of general restrictions on the first period trades of each agent. All our results are applications of the same lemma about improvements to an allocation that is either non-core or non-coalitionally fair. Roughly speaking, the lemma states that if all the members of a coalition achieve a better allocation in some way (for instance, by blocking the status quo allocation or because they envy the net trade of other coalitions) then an alternative improvement can be obtained through a perturbation of the initial improvement.

中文翻译：

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资产市场和不对称信息经济中的阻碍联盟与公平

摘要本文分析了不确定条件下两阶段交换经济中核心的两个属性：任意规模的联盟的否决权；核心分配的联盟公平性。我们研究与经典（静态）和顺序（动态）核心概念相关的这些属性，并将我们的结果应用于资产市场和非对称信息模型。我们建立了一个正式的环境，其中消费集没有下限，并且对每个代理商的第一期交易施加了一系列一般性限制。我们所有的结果都是对改善非核心或非联盟公平分配的同一引理的应用。粗略地说，引理指出，如果联盟的所有成员以某种方式（例如，