We define a cautious version of extensive-form rationalizability for generalized extensive-form games with unawareness that we call prudent rationalizability. It is an extensive-form analogue of iterated admissibility. In each round of the procedure, for each tree and each information set of a player a surviving strategy of hers is required to be rational vis-a-vis a belief system with a full-support belief on the opponents' previously surviving strategies that reach that information set. We demonstrate the applicability of prudent rationalizability. In games of disclosure of verifiable information, we show that prudent rationalizability yields unraveling under full awareness but unraveling might fail under unawareness. We compare prudent rationalizability to extensive-form rationalizability. We show that prudent rationalizability may not refine extensive-form rationalizability strategies but conjecture that the paths induced by prudent rationalizable strategy profiles (weakly) refine the set of paths induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies.

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具有意识的广义广义形式游戏的审慎合理性

我们为广义的广义形式游戏定义了谨慎形式的广义形式合理性，而没有意识到我们称之为审慎合理性。它是迭代可接纳性的广泛形式的类似物。在此过程的每一轮中，对于玩家的每棵树和每种信息集，她的生存策略都必须相对于信念系统具有理性，并且对对手先前的生存策略具有完全支持的信念该信息集。我们证明了审慎合理性的适用性。在披露可验证信息的游戏中，我们表明，在充分意识到的情况下，审慎的合理性会导致分解，但在不了解的情况下，分解可能会失败。我们将审慎的合理性与广泛形式的合理性进行比较。