Abstract This study investigates infinitely repeated games of a prisoner’s dilemma with additive separability in which the monitoring technology is imperfect and private. Behavioral incentives indicate that a player is not only motivated by pure self-interest but also by social preference such as reciprocity, and that a player often becomes naïve and selects an action randomly due to her cognitive limitation and uncertain psychological mood as well as the strategic complexity caused by monitoring imperfection and private observation. By focusing on generous tit-for-tat strategies, we characterize a behavioral version of Nash equilibrium termed behavioral equilibrium in an accuracy-contingent manner. By eliminating the gap between theory and evidence, we show that not pure self-interest but reciprocity plays a substantial role in motivating a player to make decisions in a sophisticated manner.

中文翻译：

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犯人困境的行为理论：慷慨的“以牙还牙”策略

摘要这项研究调查了具有可加可分性的囚徒困境的无限次重复博弈，这种博弈中的监控技术是不完善和私人的。行为动机表明，玩家不仅受到纯粹的自我利益的激励，还受到诸如互惠等社会偏好的激励，并且由于其认知能力的局限性和不确定的心理情绪以及策略性因素，玩家经常变得天真并随机选择一项行动监视缺陷和私人观察导致的复杂性。通过专注于慷慨的针锋相对的策略，我们以精确度或定性的方式描述了称为行为均衡的纳什均衡的行为版本。通过消除理论与证据之间的差距，