Ambiguity in the ordinary language sense means that available information is open to multiple interpretations. We model this by assuming that individuals are unaware of some possibilities relevant to the outcome of their decisions and that multiple probabilities may arise over an individual's subjective state space depending on which of these possibilities are realized. We formalize a notion of coherent multiple priors and derive a representation result that with full awareness corresponds to the usual unique (Bayesian) prior but with less than full awareness generates multiple priors. When information is received with no change in awareness, each element of the set of priors is updated in the standard Bayesian fashion (that is, full Bayesian updating). An increase in awareness, however, leads to an expansion of the individual's subjective state and (in general) a contraction in the set of priors under consideration. Keywords ambiguity, unawareness, multiple priors. JEL Classification: D81 * We thank Adam Dominiak, Peter Klibanoff, Sujoy Mukerji, Klaus Nehring, and participants at RUD2019 and at the economics seminar at UGA. We are also especially grateful to the guest editor and two anonymous referees for their patience and perseverance in reviewing earlier versions and providing us with many useful comments and suggestions that have considerably improved the clarity of our exposition.

中文翻译：

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歧义和意识：一个连贯的多重先验模型

普通语言意义上的歧义意味着可获得的信息可以进行多种解释。我们通过假设个人不知道与他们的决策结果相关的某些可能性，并根据实现这些可能性中的哪一个，在个体的主观状态空间上可能会出现多个概率来对此建模。我们对连贯的多个先验的概念进行形式化，并得出一个表示结果，该结果具有充分的知觉对应于通常的唯一（贝叶斯）先验，但具有不足的知觉会产生多个先验。当接收到的信息没有意识上的改变时，先验集合中的每个元素都以标准贝叶斯方式进行更新（即完全贝叶斯更新）。然而，意识的增强导致个人能力的扩展。的主观状态和（通常）在考虑中的先验集合中的收缩。关键字歧义，不了解，多个先验。JEL分类：D81 *感谢Adam Dominiak，Peter Klibanoff，Sujoy Mukerji，Klaus Nehring，以及RUD2019和UGA经济学研讨会的参与者。我们还要特别感谢特邀编辑和两位匿名审稿人的耐心和毅力，他们审阅了较早的版本，并为我们提供了许多有用的意见和建议，这些意见和建议大大改善了我们的论述的清晰度。