We provide a tool to model and solve strategic situations where players' perceptions are limited, in the sense that they may only be aware of, or model, some of the aspects of the strategic situations at hand, as well as situations where players realize that other players' perceptions may be limited. We define normal, repeated, incomplete information and dynamic (extensive) form games with unawareness using a unified methodology. A game with unawareness is defined as a collection of standard games (of the corresponding form). The collection specifies how each player views the game, how she views the other players' perceptions of the game and so on. The modeler's description of perceptions, the players' description of other players' reasoning, etc. are shown to have consistent representations. We extend solution concepts such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium to these games and study their properties. It is shown that while unawareness in normal form games can be mapped to incomplete information games, the extended Nash equilibrium solution is not mapped to a known solution concept in the equivalent incomplete information games, implying that games with unawareness generate novel types of behavior.

中文翻译：

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意识不足的游戏

我们提供一种工具来建模和解决玩家感知有限的战略情况，即他们可能仅了解或建模手头战略情况的某些方面以及玩家意识到其他玩家的看法可能会受到限制。我们使用统一的方法定义了不知道的正常，重复，不完整的信息和动态（广泛）的形式游戏。没有意识的游戏被定义为（对应形式的）标准游戏的集合。该集合指定每个玩家如何观看游戏，如何观看其他玩家对游戏的看法等等。建模者的感知描述，玩家对其他玩家推理的描述等均具有一致的表示。我们将诸如合理性和纳什均衡之类的解决方案概念扩展到这些博弈中，并研究其性质。结果表明，虽然正常形式博弈中的不知觉可以映射到不完全信息博弈中，但是扩展的纳什均衡解在等效不完整信息博弈中不映射到已知解的概念，这意味着不知道博弈的人会产生新颖的行为类型。