Central banks face uncertainty about the true location of the effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest rates. We model optimal discretionary monetary policy during a liquidity trap when the central bank designs policy that is robust with respect to the location of the ELB. If the central bank fears the worst-case location of the ELB, monetary conditions will be more expansionary before the liquidity trap occurs.

中文翻译：

---

下界不确定的稳健货币政策

中央银行面临有效利率下限（ELB）的真实位置的不确定性。当中央银行设计相对于ELB的位置具有鲁棒性的政策时，我们在流动性陷阱期间对最优的全权委托货币政策建模。如果央行担心ELB的最坏情况，那么在出现流动性陷阱之前，货币状况将更具扩张性。