This paper studies the role of factoring in a bilateral supply chain, where both the supplier and retailer are financially constrained. Applying the stylized Stackelberg game, we analytically present that the supplier’s capital shortage limits the advantage of trade credit provided to the retailer. To overcome this limitation, we design a hybrid strategy composing of trade credit and factoring, and then investigate how the supplier uses factoring strategy to achieve the best performance. Analytical and numerical results show that: (1) each supply chain partner can benefit from factoring, and the benefits depend on operational and financial characteristics; (2) in a fairly priced factoring market, bankruptcy costs reduce the benefits of factoring, but does not change the dominance of full factoring; (3) in a strategically priced factoring market, partial factoring may dominate full factoring. Managerially, our study implies that a supplier may benefit from dividing his accounts receivable when facing a factor with a strong pricing ability.

中文翻译：

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不确定环境下供应链金融的建模与仿真

本文研究了保理在双边供应链中的作用，其中供应商和零售商都在财务上受到限制。应用程式化的 Stackelberg 游戏，我们分析地提出供应商的资金短缺限制了提供给零售商的贸易信贷的优势。为了克服这个限制，我们设计了一种由贸易信用和保理组成的混合策略，然后研究供应商如何使用保理策略来实现最佳绩效。分析和数值结果表明：（1）每个供应链合作伙伴都可以从保理中受益，收益取决于运营和财务特征；(2)在定价合理的保理市场中，破产成本降低了保理的收益，但不改变全保理的主导地位；(3) 在战略定价的保理市场中，部分保理可能支配全保理。在管理上，我们的研究表明，当面临具有强大定价能力的因素时，供应商可能会受益于划分其应收账款。