Abstract This paper analyzes the optimal market structures and pricing strategies of a monopolist platform in a two-sided market where the agents on each side prefer the platform to be less competitive on their side; that is, in a market with negative intra-group network externalities. Results show that the equilibrium market structure varies with the extent of negative intra-group network externalities. If the negative network externalities are substantial, that is, if an agent’s disutility due to a larger sized market on his side is high (enough), then the profit-maximizing strategy for the matchmaker will be to match the highest types of one side with all of the agents on the other side. In that case, the matchmaker will charge a high entrance fee from the former side and allow free entrance to the agents of the latter side. However, if the network externalities are not substantial, then the matchmaker will maximize profits by matching an equal number of agents from each side. This paper thus provides an explanation of the asymmetric pricing schedules in two-sided markets when the matchmaker uses a one-program pricing schedule.

中文翻译：

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双向垄断市场中的集团内部负网络外部性

摘要：本文分析了双向市场中垄断者平台的最优市场结构和定价策略，在这种情况下，双方的代理商都希望平台在自己的一方竞争力较低。即在集团内部网络外部性为负的市场中。结果表明，均衡的市场结构随着负面的集团内部网络外部性的程度而变化。如果负的网络外部性很大，也就是说，如果一个代理人由于其较大的市场规模而导致的残废率很高（足够大），那么媒人的利润最大化策略就是将一方的最高类型与另一端的所有代理。在这种情况下，媒人将从前者收取高额的入场费，并允许自由进入后者的代理商。然而，如果网络外部性不是很大，那么媒人将通过在双方匹配相等数量的代理来最大化利润。因此，当媒人使用一个程序的定价表时，本文将对两面市场中的非对称定价表进行解释。