The aim of this article is to demonstrate the potential of certain acta jure gestionis to restrict the free movement of capital by way of establishing so-called “golden shares” (i.e., special rights). To that end, a Montenegrin case study is used, since it displays that a privatization contract and the subsequent shareholder’s agreement – typically jure gestionis acts – may be utilized to perpetuate a state’s influence over a privatized company in a manner equally efficient as that of certain jure imperii acts, which were found by the CJEU to represent impermissible restrictions on the free movement of capital. Finally, in view of the Montenegrin case study and the examined case law, arguments are offered and the conclusion is made that the CJEU should essentially adopt the same approach with regard to each of the two types of legal instruments utilized by states to secure their influence over privatized companies.

中文翻译：

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黑山黄金股的指控案例：候选国作为激励措施将 Acta Jure Gestionis 纳入资本自由流动限制范围的经验

本文的目的是展示某些法律行为通过建立所谓的“黄金股”（即特殊权利）来限制资本自由流动的潜力。为此，使用了黑山案例研究，因为它表明私有化合同和随后的股东协议——通常是法律继承行为——可以以与某些公司同样有效的方式来维持国家对私有化公司的影响。 CJEU 认定这些行为代表了对资本自由流动的不允许的限制。最后，鉴于黑山案例研究和经过审查的判例法，