Abstract This paper presents an account of value ascription as an illocutionary force, based on four claims: (1) that value ascription is a kind of illocutionary force, defining a specific kind of speech act, i.e. valuative speech acts (VSAs); (2) that the point of VSAs is ascribing an axiological value to a referent; (3) that VSAs create a weak, inside-oriented truth commitment; and (4) that they are therefore more about the valuating subject than they are about the valuated object. This illocutionary force is described using criteria taken from contemporary speech act theory as well as others that have proven informative. This description results in a rich taxonomy of VSAs. This shows the viability and fruitfulness of a pragmatic account of value ascription, and it contributes to the development of speech act theory, specifically with regard to the distinction between primary and secondary illocutionary points, and the speech act taxonomy itself.

中文翻译：

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对有价值的言语行为的务实解释和分类

摘要本文基于四个方面提出了一种将价值归因作为言外之力的解释：（1）价值归因是一种言外之力，它定义了一种特定的言语行为，即评价性言语行为（VSA）；（2）VSA的要点是将参照物的价值论归因于；（3）VSA建立了虚弱的，面向内部的真理承诺；（4）因此，他们更多地是关于评估主体而不是关于评估对象。这种言外之力是根据当代言语行为理论以及其他已被证明能提供信息的标准来描述的。此描述导致VSA的分类很丰富。这表明了实用的价值归属的可行性和成果，并为言语行为理论的发展做出了贡献，